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WORKING PAPER

A dynamic perspective in Freeman's stakeholder model¹

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A dynamic perspective in Freeman's stakeholder model

ABSTRACT

Stakeholder literature has acknowledged the need to complement the extant theory on stakeholder management by more dynamic perspectives. This article makes use of the recent terminology of stakewatcher and stakeseeker to illustrate the dynamic aspect of stakeholder theory transposed in the graphical representation of Freeman's stakeholder model. Presenting a few selected case studies, it applies the scheme on the concept of value responsibility chain; it exemplifies the role of stakeseekers in various forms of activism, from shareholders, NGOs and government, in the stakeholder mobilization process. The paper clarifies how stakewatchers and stakeseekers can profoundly affect stakeholder salience, especially in crises. The transposition and integration of the dynamic aspect of stakeholder theory into the graphical representation strengthen the forceful pedagogical value of the Freeman's stakeholder graphical model.

Key words:

Activist, dynamism, graphical representation, NGO, Olympic Games, responsibility, stakeholder, stakeholder model, stakeholder theory, stakeseeker, stakewatcher.

A dynamic perspective in Freeman's stakeholder model

Freeman's stakeholder model has been one of the major themes in management literature over the last decades. Stakeholder management has become an important instrument for increasing awareness around corporate responsibility and business ethics in current business practices. Much of the popularity of the stakeholder model has been achieved thanks to its powerful visual scheme and its very simplicity.

But the simplification and reductive character of the stakeholder framework has created a series of criticisms (Pesqueux and Damak-Ayadi, 2005). As all synthesised representations, models and schemes are social constructions. A number of scholars, therefore, have insisted on clarification and have emphasised the perfectible nature of the model (see, for example, Jones and Wicks, 1999; Lépineux, 2005). The graphism of the model has indeed reinforced the perception of static of the stakeholder concept. Recent literature proposes an impressive range of refinements and improvements (Fassin, 2008; 2009). The need to complement the extant theory on stakeholder management by more dynamic perspectives has been acknowledged (Lamberg, Savage and Pajunen, 2003; Lamberg, Pajunen, Parvinen and Savage, 2008; Fassin, 2008).

The objectives of this article are to specify recently introduced terminology and concepts and applying them in a dynamic approach to stakeholder theory. Building on a brief description of stakeholder definitions and classifications, the present article will further develop on the graphical representation of Freeman's stakeholder model. Illustrated with a few selected case studies, it will apply the scheme on the concept of the value chain of responsibility (Freeman, Harrison and Whicks, 2007). The author uses the recent terminology of stakeholder (Fassin, 2009) and stakeholder (Holzer, 2008) to illustrate the dynamism of stakeholders in Freeman's graphical model. The transposition and integration of the dynamic aspect of stakeholder theory into the graphical representation strengthens the forceful pedagogical value of the stakeholder graphical model.

Divergent views on stakeholder definitions

Opposed to the scheme's simplicity, stakeholder management has led to an impressive philosophical and intellectual debate with opposite interpretations. Literature (Mitchell, Agle and Wood, 1997; Orts and Strudler, 2002; Phillips, 2003: 120) detects two streams of views,

depending on a narrow or broad definition of a stakeholder. Kaler (2002) distinguishes two fundamentally different views on the definitions of stakeholder: the 'claimant' definition - any individual or group that maintains a stake in an organisation, a claim, a right or an interest - and the 'influencer' definition - those who can affect or can be affected by the firm - (Freeman, 1984: 46). Gradually, the classical 'claimant' definition has been enlarged to the 'influencer' definition. As a consequence, the list of stakeholders has been extended by pragmatic arguments from a strategic perspective. These two opposing visions of the stakeholder concept totally reflect different issues and find their foundations in the differences between managerial and legal interpretations (Fassin, 2009). This dichotomy and a combinatory use of stakeholder definitions amplified the ambiguity and created a certain ambivalence (Kaler, 2002). Several attempts have been made for stakeholder categorization and terminology.

A new classification and terminology

Stakeholders can be classified based on different elements of the typology of Mitchell, Agle and Wood (1997), legitimacy and power, and on their degree of responsibility. Based on these differences, Fassin (2009) introduced a new terminology, that clearly distinguishes three categories of stakeholders: ('real') stakeholders, "stakewatchers" and "stakekeepers". Holzer also introduces the label of "stakeseekers" (Holzer, 2008: 52), a terminology that had already been used in literature on issue management, public relations and corporate communication (Heath, 1997: xii, 82.119, etc.).

The first category of the 'real' stakeholders are essentially the classic stakeholders in the original narrow approach: those who have a concrete stake in the company, the dedicated stakeholders with a real positive and (or at least expected) loyal interest in the firm. They are the supportive stakeholders in Savage et al's typology (Savage, Nix, Whitehead and Blair, 1991).

Stakewatchers are those stakeholders, such as pressure groups, who do not really have a stake themselves but who protect the interests of real stakeholders, often as proxies or intermediaries. The group encompasses those stakeholders who look after a stake with care, attention and scrutiny, just as watchdogs do. Good examples are unions guarding the stake of employees and workers; consumer associations defending the stake of consumers; investor associations protecting the shareholders; and special interest groups watching the stake of the community and the environment.

Stakekeepers contain the independent regulators, who have no stake in the firm but who impose external control and regulations on the firm. They are further removed from the active, real stakeholders, but have influence by imposing constraints on the firm, while the firm has little reciprocal direct impact on them. The term of stakekeepers is chosen in analogy with the term of gatekeeper in innovation literature, and more recently introduced in social sciences and in finance (Coffee, 2006; Fassin, 2008). The term of gatekeeper connotes some form of outside or independent monitor who provide certification or verification. They have power to screen out, to grade or to rate the entities they scrutinise. Examples in finance are the auditors, the security analysts, the Bank Commission or the Security and Exchange Commission. A stakekeeper controls and signals, as a gatekeeper does. Governments tend to be the major generic stakekeeper. Specific stakekeepers include courts, regulatory agencies, certification organisations, independent evaluation bodies and laboratories. The press and the media form another important grouping of stakekeepers. The actions of stakekeepers find their expression in laws, norms, codes, analyses etc., and in publications. Public but also private accreditation institutions have expanded in different fields such as security and quality (ISO-norms).

The three categories have substantially different profiles. For the 'real' stakeholders, who possess a legitimate claim, power and influence are reciprocal; the firm has responsibility for them. Stakewatchers derive their power from the representation of the interests of the real stakeholders. The firm has no responsibility for stakewatchers and has no power on them. The firm can hardly influence stakewatchers, although they can considerably affect the firm. Stakekeepers are totally independent of the firm but can indirectly and externally impose responsibilities. The firm has no responsibility for stakekeepers.

Referring to the discussion on stakeholder definitions, the real stakeholders in Fassin's terminology correspond to the narrow definition of the stakeholder concept, with a selected number of legitimate stakeholders linked through a contractual relationship. The broader view of the stakeholder includes also the stakewatcher and stakekeepers, who affect, or can be affected by the firm. Hence, the claimant definition restricts the scope to the 'real' stakeholders, while the influence definition encompasses stakeholders, stakewatchers and stakekeepers. From a strategic perspective, it is essential to include stakewatchers and stakekeepers in a strategic analysis since they can harm or benefit the firm. Corporate social responsibility, on the other hand, will focus on the 'real' stakeholders.

Critiques will argue that the proposal leads towards one more terminology in addition to the numerous categorizations that already exist: primary versus secondary stakeholders, direct or indirect, generic versus specific, legitimate versus derivative, strategic and moral, core, strategic and environmental stakeholders, etc. (Frooman, 1999; Winn, 2001; Phillips, 2003a; Pesqueux et al., 2005). Fassin's proposition for new terminology is probably closest to Phillips' analysis that distinguishes normative stakeholders, derivative stakeholders and dangerous or dormant stakeholders. Normative stakeholders are those stakeholders to whom the organisation has a moral obligation: an obligation of stakeholder fairness (Phillips, 2003a). Derivative stakeholders are those groups or individuals who can either harm or benefit the organisation but to whom the organisation has no direct moral obligation as stakeholders. Dangerous stakeholders can hardly be considered as stakeholders.

Real or primary stakeholders who enjoy a direct and contractually determined relationship with a company (Clarkson, 1995), possess a real claim or a real interest. Their objective is specific, concrete. Real stakeholders have a self-interest. Pressure groups generally do not initially have organisationally framed links, but they define and claim new stakes. In Clarkson's definition, they are secondary stakeholders (Clarkson, 1995). Activists and NGOs seek to have a voice in the corporation's decision-making and to participate in the public debate. Holzer therefore labels them as "stakeseekers" rather than stakeholders (Holzer, 2008: 52). Stakeseekers belong to the marginal and non-supportive stakeholders in Savage et al.'s typology (Savage et al., 1991).

Activists and NGOs can be viewed as acting as intermediaries of stakeholder groups (Fassin, 2010). They represent stakeholders in certain societal debates and advocate for their rights. Their claim represents an indirect interest in defending the interests of the real stakeholders. Special interest groups, such as neighbourhood committees, represent the interest of the local community. Most NGOs are further removed than this from a direct interest: they generally represent a more abstract interest; their concerns are often more noble, idealistic - a good cause, defence of human rights and labour conditions, the environment and the rights of future generations (Schepers, 2006).

Fassin's terminology offers several advantages: three different singular terms offer a clear distinction between primary and secondary stakeholders, the latter group being divided in pressure groups and regulators which offers an additional clarification. The terms stakewatchers and stakekeepers do not include the term stakeholders as such, which is the

case for derivative or secondary stakeholder, a compound term too long to be used in practice. The analogy with more familiar terms is also highly appealing. The term of stakewatchers refers to watchdog and the term of stakekeeper refers to gatekeeper.

The term of stakeseeker (Holzer, 2008) subtly introduces a dynamic aspect in stakeholder terminology, which can be very interesting in function of Mitchell et al's typology, who argue that the attributes of power and salience vary over time. Stakeseekers are the representatives of secondary stakeholders who want to have a voice and who want to achieve the status of stakeholder or rather stakewatcher status. Some of these stakeseekers are false and uncontrolled influencers, the activist groups and terrorists who do not want the good of the firm, and who can harm it through unjustified and unfair actions or by spreading false information. They may pursue a hidden agenda and often act without warning. A more appropriate term might be 'stake impostors' (Fassin, 2009).

The proposed categorisation thus includes five distinct groups: stakeholders who hold stakes, the stakewatchers who watch over a stake and the stakekeepers who keep the stake. The dynamic character of stakeholder terminology is expressed in the group of stakeseekers, who seek for a stake and can evolve to stakewatchers or stake impostors, depending from the seriousness of their intention. Finally, there are non-stakeholders that have no relation or do not affect the company.

Imperfections of the graphical representation and improvements

The innovative analysis of the refined stakeholder model in Fassin (2008) chose a radically different approach: the graphical framework used as the central perspective. This approach covers an overlooked aspect of stakeholder theory: the link to the graphical scheme, and the analysis of inconsistencies between definitions and the graphical model. Confronting Freeman's graphical scheme with the two definitions, it is assumed that the number of stakeholders is not restricted, but kept low for reasons of clarity. The major shortcomings of the popular stakeholder framework are systematically confronted with the graphical scheme to illustrate their visual impact: the heterogeneity within stakeholders groups, the multiple inclusion or 'double appurtenance', the variability in the dependence among stakeholders, the variability in salience and the impact of the various stakeholders, the differences in dependence among stakeholders and intensity of interaction, the multiple linkages and the network relationships.

To better reflect the reality, the graphical model can be represented with ovals of different sizes and intensities that reflect the relative importance of the various stakeholder categories. Bi-directional arrows with variable width express a relationship and interaction, but also dependence and reciprocity (Phillips, 2003: 166). A similar approach has also been used by Elms and Phillips (2009) to express the reciprocity inherent in moral responsibilities between firms and stakeholders and to illustrate the three forms of pragmatic, cognitive and moral legitimacy.

In the same way, the multilateral contracts among the stakeholders and the other various shortcomings can be explained with a more sophisticated graphical representation (Key, 1999; Rowley, 1997; Post, Preston and Sachs 2002). Finally, every stakeholder has its own subset of stakeholders, with associated obligations and influences. This gives rise to a network model of stakeholder theory, in the form of a web of stakeholder's stakeholders (Rowley, 1997; Key, 1999).

Transposing the shortcomings and the imperfections in the stakeholder model's graphical scheme, indeed illustrates that reality is far more complex and that graphs tend to simplify. It is however possible to graphically integrate shortcomings. The graphical illustrations of the imperfections help explain the sometimes oversimplified generalisation inherent to every graphical model. By superimposing the various graphical clarifications, a scheme could be elaborated that should be closer to reality. As the complexity would make the scheme confusing, the model would lose its pedagogical value. With the tacit and implicit acceptance of the simplifications, Freeman's framework therefore still stands as a rather good approximation of reality.

The proposed systematic categorisation of stakeholders leads to a new graphical representation that integrates the concepts of stakewatchers and stakekeepers: the enhanced and refined version or the stake model of the corporation (Fassin, 2009: 124, figure 5). It keeps close to Freeman's adapted model without losing the completeness offered by the Post, Preston and Sachs view (Post, Preston and Sachs, 2002). The hub-spoke model of Freeman's original model is gradually transformed into a kind of solar system with a central oval sun and surrounding planets. The ovals fully outside the ring represent the stakekeepers in much the same way as the external ovals in Freeman's adapted version. In this new stake model, the firm (or corporation) encompasses the core and all stakeholders within the ring. The hub is the management rather than the firm. Since most of the stakekeepers exert influence on the firm

through multiple stakeholders, their relations can be represented by multiple arrows from the specific stakeholders to their associated stakeholders, and from the generic stakeholders to various stakeholders of the firm.


It has to be confirmed that the adapted, refined stake model, as every model, is a simplified construct. For the sake of simplification, but keeping these clarifications and nuances in mind, the figure as presented here places the stakeholder groups in the appropriate oval section for their most-likely dominant function. For the same obvious reasons of clarity, the multiple linkages between stakeholders (Phillips, 2003: 127) and the network relations among the various stakeholders, as quite rightly addressed by Rowley (1997), are not represented on the graph (by superposition), but have been tacitly and implicitly accepted (Fassin, 2008). Drawing on the web-based representation of the network model of stakeholder relations (Rowley, 1997), the recently proposed concept of responsibility chain can be introduced in the graphical representation (Freeman, Harrison and Wicks, 2007).

The value chain of responsibility

In the past, a firm had a limited responsibility for only its part of the value creation chain. Society held corporations accountable for how they used and modified materials provided by the suppliers. Today, enterprise strategy encompasses the complete chain of value creation and trade from the supplier of raw materials to the end user. Nowadays, the chain of value has evolved to a chain of responsibility. *“Increasingly today companies are being held accountable for the effects of their actions, the effect of their stakeholders’ actions throughout the value chain”* (Freeman, Harrison and Wicks, 2007: 14-15).

The value responsibility chain encompasses the producer of raw material, his subcontractor, the producer, the distributor, the grocery store and the final customer, each with her own stakeholder and his own network of stakeholders. This value responsibility chain as presented in figure 1 and restricted to one stakeholder per step in the chain is an illustration of the network model of stakeholder theory (Rowley, 1997).

Figure 1. The value responsibility chain
(Adapted from Freeman, Harrison and Wicks, 2007)



The concept of value responsibility chain will be elucidated with a few classical case studies: a.o. the Exxon Valdez disaster in Alaska, the Erika-Total catastrophe in Brittany and the attacks on the Olympic Torch journey.

Exxon was responsible for the oil spill disaster on the Alaska caused by its tanker the Exxon Valdez in 1989. The captain, an employee of the Exxon corporation, caused harm to other stakeholders of the corporation, the residents of the Alaska coast.

In 1999, another tanker, the Erika, polluted the shores of Brittany. The Erika was not owned but chartered by the oil company Total. The responsibility for the oil disaster was the direct responsibility of the transport company, and its captain, a stakeholder of a stakeholder of Total. Notwithstanding this, the environmentalists attacked the oil company Total for not having taken a safe choice in their supplier. The judgement in 2008 reckoned Total as guilty of imprudence due to the age of the ship, and was sentenced in solidum with the ship-owner, the handler and the expert company to pay indemnitiesⁱ.

Stakewatchers and stakeseekers, pressure groups and NGOs make use of the whole value responsibility chain to reach their targets (Phillips and Caldwell, 2005; Zeitsma & Winn, 2008). Nike and other multinational companies were attacked for the use of in the factories of their South-Asian subcontractors. NGOs do not hesitate to attack a corporation because of the

problems caused by the supplier, but also for problems with other stakeholders, such as partners, associates or sponsors.

Firms do team up with partners for economical reasons, for publicity or for reputation.

Companies do sponsoring to some organizations or events. They aim to benefit from the media attention of some unique events or to be associated with successful or prestigious organizations. This can graphically be illustrated by a relationship between firm and sponsor or partner.

But this sponsoring has some drawbacks, when things turn out differently. A number of firms stopped sponsoring cycling with the doping scandals, or hesitated to continue their sponsoring in soccer when fraud cases occurred. Donations to the French Cancer Research Association, ARC (Fassin, 2010)ⁱⁱ dropped by two thirds after the fraud was discovered. Everybody wants to be associated with success stories, nobody wants to be associated with fraudeurs or with losers. Reputation works in both directions.

A small number of fraud cases of some large companies have indeed damaged the whole business community. As an indirect and unintended consequence of the unethical behaviour of well-known managers, they also tarnished the reputation of the business schools (Goshal, 2005). A few years later, a few bank managers and hedge funds managers, have provoked a global financial crisis and the hardest recession. They have harmed the reputation of the whole banking sector. The value responsibility chain extends stakeholder management beyond the classical borders of the corporation's direct stakeholder model. Even an indirect association with a stakeholder is considered by stakeholders as NGOs and pressure groups as a sufficient reason to attack if this approach leads to more publicity in the media. Illustration of these tactics are the attacks of companies that are active in countries with regimes as Burma that do not respect human rights, or in the past in South-Africa during the Apartheid. Also institutions that act as stakekeepers have been victim of activists' attacks, leading to a further stage in the value chain of responsibility. Anti-globalist activists have taken this tactic a step ahead by attacking economic institution as the World Bank of the World Trade Association (Winston, 2002). The final escalation is illustrated by the attack with violence of a neutral a-political organization as the International Olympic Committee for non respect by the Chinese of human rights in Tibet a few months before the Beijing Games (Fassin, 2010)ⁱⁱⁱ.

By hosting the Olympic Games in Beijing in August 2008, the Chinese government hoped to provide a showcase for the country's economic boom and to celebrate its new role on the world stage. The Chinese prepared the Olympic games with great professionalism with

attention to all the details. However, in March 2008, protest demonstrations were held in Tibet for greater freedom. The rioters were violently repressed by Chinese officials, resulting in more than 100 deaths. Tibet was closed to the international media. This political event happened a few weeks before the launch of the Olympic torch relay in Greece, a journey that would visit 21 countries over 130 days,

At the end of March, the flame-lighting ceremony in Greece was hit by protesters from 'Reporters sans Frontières' (reporters without borders) who breached heavy security to unfurl a banner behind the Chinese official who was giving a speech. One week later, in Paris, thousands of French police struggled to allow the Olympic torch to move through the crowd. Protesters objected to China's policies in Tibet and to its human rights shortcomings, leading to chaotic scenes and protesters scaling the Eiffel Tower. The Chinese were indignant. They had envisaged the event as a 'journey of harmony' to promote understanding between China and the West, and experienced the opposite reaction.

A few days later, demonstrations were also organised to block the torches route in London and in San Francisco, where the route had to be changed. Calls for a boycott of the Opening Ceremony of the Olympics by political leaders raised anxiety and anger in Beijing. Chinese nationalists urged consumers through online and SMS campaigns to boycott French products and retailers. Carrefour, the French supermarket chain, had to launch a public relations campaign as a defensive reaction to reaffirm its support for China and the Olympics.

When they attack the Olympic torch, the symbol of the Olympic movement, the stakeholders attack the leaders of a country, a partner of the IOC organizer. The IOC has not any responsibility on the situation of human rights in Tibet nor any authority on the Chinese government.

The case studies of Exxon Valdez, Erika-Total and the Olympic Torch journey all illustrate that stakeholder statute is not static. On the contrary, stakeholder relations have a profound dynamic aspect.

The dynamic aspect of stakeholder theory

Relationships between a firm and its stakeholders change over time. While strategic stakeholder thinking as a structural theory explains the existing relationships among organizations' constituencies and actors (Freeman 1984; Nasi, 1995), strategic stakeholder thinking as a process theory explains why these relationships change over time (Savage et al,

1991; Savage, Dunkin and Ford, 2004). Every stakeholder role is thus temporary, context and issue specific (Winn, 2001; Kochan and Rubinstein, 2000; Jawahar and McLaughlin, 2001; Friedman and Miles, 2002; Phillips, 2003a). Studies on advocacy groups and NGO literature have introduced the potential to cooperate with or threaten an organization as a key stakeholder classification (Savage, Dunkin and Ford, 2004). In fact, the NGO literature with the social movement theory has implicitly induced the notion of dynamism of stakeholder in the stakeholder framework (Doh and Teegen, 2002; Zietsma and Winn, 2008; de Bakker and den Hond, 2008). Stakeholder status is thus subject to change as it reflects the urgency of the claim (Phillips, 2003a). Press coverage and the media can suddenly highlight a claim - as a serious incident, a demonstration or a boycott - from a specific pressure group in such a manner that a stakeholder or stakeseeker can, overnight, become a primary stakeholder (Carroll and Buchholtz, 2006: 71).

This dynamic aspect of stakeholders is alluded to as another apparent shortcoming of the graphical representation of the stakeholder (Savage et al, 2008; Fassin, 2008). The model in the form of a diagram indeed gives a static impression of the situation. It can create a false illusion that the categories are fixed. Many scholars seem to have overlooked the fact that Freeman warned about this important 'simplification' of the stakeholders' map in his seminal book (1984: 57).

Several attempts to graphically illustrate stakeholder dynamism have been made by other authors, some using older typologies (Lamberg et al., 2003; Savage et al. 2004; Savage et al., 1992). More especially Lamberg et al. (2008) adopted a path dependence perspective to move towards a behavioural and dynamic theory of stakeholder management (Lamberg et al, 2008: 849). Their analysis emphasized the dependence on initial conditions and the sequence of decisions and policies, especially during crises or organizational transitions. Crises may indeed drastically reshape the salience of affected stakeholders (Alpaslan et al. 2009: 40).

Two additional recent cases will illustrate the dynamic aspect of stakeholder relations: the collapse and rescue of the Fortis group in the financial crisis, and the problems of restructuring the European Opel factories of General Motors.

Case Fortis and Case Opel - General Motors

The collapse of the Fortis group in the financial crisis in September 2008 provides an interesting illustration of a situation of urgency. The financial situation of the bank became so critical that

the Belgian and Dutch government had to take hard decisions, in turbulent times, within the constraints of the law. It was confronted with the dilemma of conflicting interests of shareholders, customers, employees, the state and the government. Mitchell et al. (1997) distinguished three major attributes of stakeholders – power, legitimacy and urgency; and introduced the terminology of dormant, dangerous and definitive stakeholders to reflect their salience. The Fortis case perfectly illustrates how the dramatic changes in power and salience affected stakeholders. Traditionally, the financial group had many dormant stakeholders. Typical of a situation with a dispersed ownership, the management and board held power and legitimacy, and were the dominant group. The state had the conventional role of controller, and provider of the external infrastructure and receiver of tax levies. A stakeholder becomes an active stakeholder. As the thousands of small shareholders that had been passive and dormant but, with the crisis, their claims became more salient and urgent. Minor stakeholders became stakeholders, who looked for new stakeholders to defend their case. Representatives of minority investors and lawyers emerged, changing the dormant stakeholders into dangerous stakeholders. They became active in the search for proxies that could tilt any decisions in their favour.

The problems of General Motors at the end of 2008 and its chapter 11 procedure leads to dismantling and reorganisation of the corporation. The plan leads to a disinvestment of subsidiaries. One of the major European brands of the global corporation is Opel with eleven factories in Europe: two in Germany, one in Spain (Zaragoza), in Belgium (Antwerp), in Russia (St-Petersburg), and in other countries.

Three candidates applied for the investment, Fiat, the Italian car manufacturer, RHJ, an investment company, and Magna, a manufacturer of car components. Each of these three groups has its own plan of rationalisation, and possibly reduction of the number of production sites to adapt to the lower capacity. The unions of each factory become active to defend the thousands of workers in their factory. In each country, the local government intervenes with plans for support, sometimes subsidy or help. So with this dramatic change, a huge number of relatively dormant stakeholders, the local government, become salient. Prioritising amongst stakeholders is on the agenda.

The stakeholders of the local factories intervene: local governments visit GM's headquarters and invite the three candidates to defend their local industry and employment. They want to have their view taken into account in the choice of the acquirer.

When GM announces begin of 2010, not to pursue with the sale of their Opel subsidiary, but to pursue its operation under their management, suddenly all positions are shaken, once more.

Governments are lobbying, with the surveillance of the European Commission to prevent national governments to subsidy some restructuring operations. The unions try to have a strong unified position over the European countries. When the Spanish union agrees to the plan of the Spanish government to help the Zaragoza plan, a breach occurs in the union front. Again, stakeholder dynamics affects the relations between the various stakeholders and their salience.




Figure 2. The sale of Opel by GM

Figure 2 shows a simplified stakeholder map of the negotiation with GM for the independence of Opel Europe through buyout by three groups.

Succinct analysis of the cases

What normally is a pure private business between seller and potential buyer, turns out to a much more important complex web of dynamic forces between various stakeholders. The German chancellor Angela Merkel plays a leading role in the process, where also other governments try to influence the decisions. So government once rather passive stakeholder, becomes in a very short time a major actor in the process. A stakeholder becomes a real important stakeholder. Stakeholders as unions look for alliances with stakekeepers, the government.

This GM case also illustrates the notion of stakeholder multiplicity, where different stakeholders who make the same or complementary claims upon the organization, strengthen and reinforce the salience of the claim (Neville and Menguc, 2006; Rowley and Moldoveanu, 2003).

The Opel case supports Lamberg et al's proposition that the greater the number of linkages between and among stakeholders, the more complex the stakeholder network and the less predictable are stakeholder reactions during organisational transitions (Lamberg et al, 2008: 851). The Fortis case also displays how blurring boundaries and multiple identities of stakeholder groups affect governance in organizational transition. The multiple roles of Fortis' shareholders as shareholder, creditor and elector, increased the complexity of the web of commitments. New stakeholders appeared to have an important role regarding the success or failure in organizational transitions (Lamberg et al., 2003: 857).

Stakeholder dynamism transposed in the graphical model

While the cases explain the change of salience, this phenomenon is not reflected in the rather static graphical model. However, the dynamism of evolution of stakeholder salience can be illustrated graphically, in the form of a sequence of successive graphs or in a powerpoint. Three of the case studies will be used to illustrate the dynamism of stakeholder salience and the stakeholder value responsibility chain; they will show the effect of actions and reactions provoked by an accident, such as the Exxon Valdez, the Erika-Total case and the Olympic Torch case. For reasons of space, we will only present the final graphs, that combine the successive steps.

The Exxon Valdez case.

Applied to the Exxon Valdez case, the dynamic graph is presented in figure 3.




Figure 3 : The stakeholders map of the Exxon Valdez case.

The accident of the tanker Exxon Valdez in 1989 is caused by the captain, employee of the firm Exxon. The oil spill in Alaska harms the local residents (1). As a reaction environmental activist groups emerge and attack the corporation (2). The news is relayed by the press who attacks the firm (3) and consequently, indirectly affects also the firm's stakeholders, customers and employees of the firm (4). The drop in share price as a result of the accident results in a loss of reputation and harms the shareholders of the firm (5).

The Erika-Total case

Figure 4 presents the dynamic graph as applied to the Erika case.





Figure 4 : The stakeholders map of the Erika-Total case

The accident of the tanker Erika is caused by the captain, employee of the firm chartered by Total. The oil spill in Brittany harms the local residents (1). As in the previous case, environmental activist groups take actions to defend the natural environment and the resident's position. They attack Total, directly, as the large corporation that sub-contracted the transport (2). The news is relayed by the press who attacks Total (3); this indirectly affects also the firm's stakeholders, customers and employees (4). The drop in share price as a result of the accident results in a loss of reputation and harms the shareholders of the firm (5).

The Olympic Torch journey case

In the Olympic torch case, the simplified stakeholder's map for the Olympic games is presented in figure 5a and the simplified stakeholder's map for Tibet is presented in figure 5b. The Olympic Games are assigned by the IOC organizer to the city of Beijing, and represent a partnership between both institutions. Both are stakeholders with mutual and dependent relations. Besides it, there is the local political context. Tibet is a part, annexed by China in 1953, and is considered as a province by China, under rule of the Chinese Government whereas an important part of the Tibeti population still hope for more independence.

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CHINA - TIBET




Fig 5a. The Olympic Games in, Beijing Fig 5b. The stakeholders map for Tibet.

The link between the two stakeholders maps of the Olympic games and of Tibet, is China, capital of Beijing host of the Olympic games. China is a common stakeholder of both the Beijing and Tibet, and consequently a stakeholder of its both stakeholders, the IOC and the Tibeti population. The repression by the Chinese government is signalled by the media, who attack China and the lack of freedom. Some activist group 'Reporters sans Frontières' make use of the launch of the Olympic Torch journey ceremony in Delphi to attack the Olympic Torch.

Figure 6 presents the combined stakeholder network of the IOC and Tibet, with the successive steps in the attacks and reactions, that can be built up, in several powerpoint slides that illustrate the sequence: repression (1), reaction from the media (2), action from the activists – the attacks on the torch (3), reaction from the media (4), harm caused by the activists to the IOC (5), and harm to the athletes (6) who have prepared the games and are threatened by a possible withdrawal from the Olympic Games by their country.




Figure 6 : The dynamics in the Olympic Torch journey

In the same way, a sequence of slides at successive longitudinal steps can highlight the changing salience of the various stakeholders in the GM Opel case, or in the Fortis case.

Stakeholder dynamics: the role of stakewatchers and stakeseekers

The analysis with the sequence of graphical representations helps in the study of the stakeholder dynamics at play. It exemplifies the role of stakewatcher and stakeseekers in the social movement and stakeholder mobilization process (Rowley and Moldoveanu, 2003; de Bakker & den Hond, 2008; King, 2008).

In most cases, actions departures from justified grievances from stakeholders that have been harmed or deprived by a precipitating event, accident, or by a crucial decision. This phenomenon is applicable for various groups of stakeholders: employees (Opel), shareholders (Fortis), the local population (Brittany). Existing and emerging stakewatchers mobilize resources to take actions and to search for support from other stakeholders, in particular from the public opinion and government. Opel’s unions organize protest actions and demonstrations; associations of individual Fortis‘ shareholders launch class actions; the local population of Brittany participates actively in the protest actions and in the volunteers’ campaigns for cleaning up of the spoiled coast. The stakewatchers make use of the chain of responsibility to involve other important stakeholders into the debate: they approach the government; they make use of the media to sensibilize the public opinion and to gain visibility

for their cause. Their actions profoundly change the salience and status of the dormant stakeholders, and create a cascade of delegitimation for the focal organization^{iv}. The press impact heavily affects the reputation of the attacked companies: Exxon, Total, Fortis and GM; all have been seriously blamed by the press and the local public opinion.

In the Olympic torch journey case, the activist's action is launched by a minority group of reporters who create the event themselves. In this example of NGO activism, a less-known association, '*Reporters without borders*' make use of the publicity value of an event to choose their target, whereas the target has any or a limited responsibility in the issue. They are stakeseekers who seek to have a voice. They provoke an incident and make use of the media to bring their cause to the attention of the public opinion. In this case, there is no direct link between the organizer (IOC) of the event that is attacked, and the deprived stakeholders (Tibeti population); there is only an indirect connection. The stakeseekers make use of the responsibility chain to attack the stakeholder's stakeholder. They pick up a well-known respected organisation that addresses a worldwide public through the media, an entity that has no direct responsibility in the issue, but that has a partnership with a stakeholder of this entity. Through a cascade effect throughout the responsibility chain, they reach the stakeholder responsible for the cause they want to defend. By attacking the Olympic Torch journey, and the Beijing Olympic Games, they try to exert pressures on the Chinese government. Just as the Chinese government is using the Olympic games as propaganda for its own sake, to show the world what their country is able to accomplish. It is the combination of the opportunity offered by a well-known event that takes place in the country where problems of other reasons occur that is taken up by the stakeseeker to have its message relayed by the media. And curiously whereas the attribution of the Olympic Games has a political dimension and contains a risk factor, protest against the candidature of Beijing in the candidature phase, eight years earlier, did never achieve the impact that a small NGO now obtains with this improvised minor action. The ironical paradox is that this method ends up with violence, an NGO striving for respect of Tibeti population attacking a symbol of peace and freedom. In situations of turbulence or crisis, stakeholder dynamics are somewhat unpredictable (Lamberg et al., 2008). Social mobilization theories, marketing but also serendipity factors explain that actions of stakeseekers may have an impact that is out of proportion with the power or influence of the stakeholder group they represent.

Conclusion

Modelling and graphical representation shed key insights onto stakeholder thinking at both the academic and practitioner level. The application of the graphical representation of the events described in the case studies contributes to clarify the dynamic character of stakeholder theory. This paper therefore extends the stakeholder model and its graphical representation beyond the classical static analysis to a process theory approach.

This analysis builds further on previous attempts (Lamberg et al, 2003; Savage et al, 1992) who used older typologies and introduced path dependencies in organizational transitions (Lamberg et al. 2008). It shows how the use of the graphical model can help to understand social movement and stakeholder mobilization theories (Rowley and Moldoveanu, 2003). It also elucidates the importance of the stakeholder responsibility chain: by showing how critical incidents affecting an entity's chain of responsibility may activate stakewatchers and stakeseekers, and seriously affect the salience and status of stakeholders. The case studies illustrate the dynamic role of stakeseekers in various forms of activism, from shareholders, NGOs and government. The cases demonstrate that activist salience increases in crises, when management's decisions do not sufficiently take into consideration stakeholders interests. The illustration of the action and reaction process on precipitating events based on the use of the stakewatcher and stakeseeker constructs offers a largely unexploited potential as a tool in strategic analysis for practitioners. It clarifies the role of stakewatcher and stakeseekers in the stakeholder mobilization process. The integration of the dynamic aspect in the graphical stakeholder model heighten the pedagogical value of Freeman's model. This dynamic perspective widens the realm of stakeholder theory.

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^{iv} I owe this phrasing and observation to an anonymous reviewer.